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The phenomenon of ambiguity aversion, in which risky gambles with known probabilities
are preferred over ambiguous gambles with unknown probabilities, has been thoroughly
documented in adults but never measured in children. Here, we use two distinct tasks to
investigate ambiguity preferences of children (8- to 9-year-olds) and a comparison group
of adults (19- to 27-year-olds). Across three separate measures, we found evidence for
signiﬁcant ambiguity aversion in adults but not in children and for greater ambiguity aversion
in adults compared to children. As ambiguity aversion in adults has been theorized to
result from a preference to bet on the known and avoid the unfamiliar, we separately
measured familiarity bias and found that children, like adults, are biased towards the familiar.
Our ﬁndings indicate that ambiguity aversion emerges across the course of development
between childhood and adolescence, while a familiarity bias is already present in childhood.
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INTRODUCTION
Economists and psychologists distinguish between two types of
decision-making under uncertainty: risky decisions feature uncer-
tain outcomes with known probabilities (i.e., a 50% chance of
winning $5), while ambiguous decisions feature uncertain out-
comes with unknown probabilities (i.e., an unknown chance of
winning $5; Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961). Notably, while decision
makers are averse to both types of uncertainty, decision mak-
ers tend to be even more averse to ambiguity than they are to
risk – at least when tested as adults. For example, when offered
the chance to win a prize by drawing a red ball from a risky
urn of 50% red, 50% black balls or an ambiguous urn with
an unknown mix of red and black balls, adults prefer to draw
from the risky urn (Ellsberg, 1961). Adults are also willing to
pay more for the chance to draw from a risky urn than from
an ambiguous urn (Eisenberger and Weber, 1995). Ambiguity
aversion has been consistently found in studies of adult decision-
making behavior (see Camerer and Weber, 1992 for review) – and
it shares at least some similarities with risk aversion (Lauriola et al.,
2007).
Evidence suggests, however, that risk and ambiguity engage
distinct processes as well (Lauriola et al., 2007). Adults’ behav-
ioral risk preferences have been found to be correlated with their
ambiguity preferences only under certain conditions (Lauriola
and Levin, 2001) or not at all (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990; Levy
et al., 2010). Studies using neuroimaging techniques have found
risky and ambiguous decision-making to share some neural pro-
cesses in reward-related brain regions (Levy et al., 2010) but also
to engage distinct circuitry elsewhere in the brain (Hsu et al., 2005;
Huettel et al., 2006; Krain et al., 2006; Bach et al., 2009). Because
assessments of risk and ambiguity have been found to be both
behaviorally and neurally distinct, a complete understanding of
decision-making under uncertainty must include both risky and
ambiguous decision-making.
Several studies have investigated the development of risk pref-
erences in children (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Levin and Hart, 2003;
Eshel et al., 2007; Levin et al., 2007a,b; Rakow and Rahim, 2010;
Paulsen et al., 2011, 2012;Weller et al., 2011) with the ultimate goal
to predict and prevent real-world maladaptive reckless behavior.
Decisions made outside of the laboratory, however, are more likely
to be ambiguous than risky, as individuals rarely know the exact
probability contingencies of such decisions. Because preferences
for ambiguity may better predict real-world decision-making than
do preferences for risk, an understanding of the development of
ambiguity preferences is important for guiding policies to promote
advantageous decision-making. Yet there is a paucity of studies
investigating how ambiguity aversion emerges and changes across
development. Just one study has compared adolescents (12- to
17-year-olds) to adults and found reduced ambiguity aversion in
adolescents relative to adults in the gain domain (Tymula et al.,
2012) but similar levels of ambiguity neutrality in adolescents
and adults in the loss domain (Tymula et al., 2013). Another
study found ambiguity aversion in adolescents (10- to 18-year-
olds) but did not include an adult comparison group (Sutter
et al., 2013). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no
prior studies comparing ambiguity aversion in children to that of
adults.
In the current study, we characterized attitudes towards risk
and ambiguity in 8- and 9-year-old children and a comparison
group of 19- to 27-year-old adults. Were children to treat ambi-
guity in the same manner as adults, we would ﬁnd ambiguity
aversion in both age groups. Instead, we found no evidence for
ambiguity aversion in children, signiﬁcant evidence for ambiguity
aversion in adults, and signiﬁcantly greater ambiguity aversion in
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adults than in children. Because different methods for measuring
preferences can elicit inconsistent valuations of the same gamble
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971), we used multiple tasks in order to
minimize the chance that our conclusions were speciﬁc to a par-
ticular task. Our results were consistent across multiple tasks and
independent measures, indicating that our ﬁndings were robust
to different methods of preference measurement. We addition-
ally evaluated whether differences in ambiguity aversion between
children and adults might, instead, reﬂect a relative preference
for familiar stimuli – as advanced as a potential explanation for
ambiguity aversion in adults (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Fox and
Tversky, 1995; Fox and Weber, 2002). We measured children’s
preference for betting on items that provided an illusion of greater
knowledge in a child-friendly familiarity bias task, and found that
children (like adults) exhibited a signiﬁcant familiarity bias. Our
ﬁndings indicate that ambiguity aversion emerges over the course
of development from childhood to adulthood but disconﬁrm the




Forty-two children (21 female; mean age = 8.7 years;
range = 8.1–9.9 years) and 40 young adults (17 female; mean
age = 22.4 years; range = 19.2–27.8 years) were recruited from the
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill area of North Carolina. We chose
children of this age range because they are the youngest age that
could comprehend all task instructions, are just beginning to
receive formal education in fractions (Common Core State Stan-
dards Initiative [CCSSI], 2014), and are starting to make complex,
accurate assessments of probability (Falk et al., 2012). Informed
consent was collected from adult participants and parents of child
participants, and written assent was collected from child partici-
pants under a protocol approved by the Institutional ReviewBoard
of Duke University. Children’s parents were paid $10 for their
child’s participation, plus $10-15 for travel expenses. Child partic-
ipants received toys of their choice. Adult participants were paid
$10, plus a cash bonus that was based on the outcome of a ran-
domly selected Bar Choice trial, a randomly selected willingness
to pay (WTP) trial, and their accuracy on the Familiarity Bias task
(see below).
BAR STIMULI AND TRAINING
Participants were informed that they would be playing games to
win tokens, with the goal to win as many tokens as possible. Chil-
dren were informed that the tokens could be used to purchase
prizes (toys and stickers) at the end of the study, while adults
were informed that the tokens would be exchanged for a cash
bonus at the end of the study. In order to minimize differences
in subjective reward valuation between participants or age groups
(Geier and Luna, 2012), the exchange rates for the tokens were
not revealed to participants until the end of the experimental ses-
sion. Children’s exchange rates were set on an individual basis
so that all children could “purchase” one high quality toy or two
medium quality toys. The exchange rate for adults was $0.25 per
token.
FIGURE 1 | Stimuli and tasks. Red and blue represent the chance of
winning a small (two tokens) or large (12 tokens) reward. The color
representing the large reward was counterbalanced across participants.
(A) Example risky bars. A total of 11 different risky bars representing
different probabilities were used. (B) All four ambiguous bars used.
(C) Example Bar Choice trial featuring a risky bar versus an ambiguous bar.
Participants indicated with a key press which of the two bars they
preferred. (D) Example of a Bar Choice “catch” trial. If red represented the
bigger win, participants should select the risky bar. If blue represented the
bigger win, participants should select the ambiguous bar. (E) Example
willingness to pay (WTP) trial. Each bar was presented on the left of the
screen with its endpoints labeled with their associated reward values.
Participants used arrow keys to toggle the number on the right up or down
until it reached their maximum WTP for the displayed bar.
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Stimuli consisted of bars divided into red and blue portions
(Hayden et al., 2010; Levy et al., 2010), in which the colors
represented the chance of winning a small (2 tokens) or large (12
tokens) reward. The color representing the large reward was coun-
terbalanced across participants. The red portion of the bars always
appeared above the blue portion. Eleven risky stimuli (Figure 1A)
representing 10, 25, 33, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 67, 75, and 90% chances
of winning were used with all of the adults and 32 of the children
(10 children used a subset of seven risky stimuli representing 10,
25, 33, 50, 67, 75, and 90% chances of winning; after initial testing
in those 10 children revealed drastic preference shifts between 33
and 50% or between 50 and 67% chances of winning, additional
levels of risk were added to capture more subtle changes in pref-
erence). Ambiguous stimuli (Figure 1B) featured a gray occluder
centered at the midpoint of a risky bar. The size of the occluder
varied across trials to determine the level of ambiguity (33, 50, 80,
and 100%). The ambiguous bars revealed equivalent amounts of
red and blue at the endpoints.
All participants were trained in the experimental stimuli and
tasks before data collection. Children were trained one-on-one
by an experienced experimenter. Adults read the instructions
independently and then completed training trials under an exper-
imenter’s supervision. The reward value (2 or 12 tokens) repre-
sented by the bars’ colors (red and blue) was explicitly stated to
participants. The ambiguous bars were explained via animations
in which the occluder moved laterally off a 50% ambiguous bar
to reveal what colors were beneath it. All different combinations
of red and blue (i.e., all red, all blue, half red and half blue, more
red than blue, and more blue than red) were shown to underscore
that the occluder could be hiding any probability. Both children
and adults had to correctly answer questions about the stimuli
and procedures before they were allowed to begin the experimen-
tal session. For example, to demonstrate their understanding of
the risky stimuli, participants had to correctly explain which of
several risky bars represented the greatest chance of winning the
most tokens. To demonstrate their understanding of the ambigu-
ous stimuli, participants had to correctly explain which risky bars
could and could not be under an ambiguous bar’s gray occluder.
Children were asked and answered the questions verbally while
adults answered the same questions on a worksheet. If participants
did not answer a question correctly, the experimenter repeated the
training instructions until the participants could answer the ques-
tion correctly. Average training time was approximately 15 min for
children and 10 min for adults.
TASKS
Participants performed four tasks in the following order: (1) Bar
Choice (approximately 15 min), (2)WTP (approximately 10 min),
(3) Bar Probability (approximately 5 min), and (4) Familiarity
Bias (approximately 5 min). Total session time was approximately
50 min for children and 45 min for adults.
Bar Choice
In the Bar Choice task, participants were asked to choose which
of two bars they preferred (Figure 1C). Participants were shown
all possible pairings of risky versus ambiguous bars (28 trials for
the 10 children who used the limited set of risky stimuli; 44 trials
for all other participants) and ambiguous versus ambiguous bars
(six trials for all participants). The bars remained on the screen
until participants indicated their preference using a left or right
key press. After a key press was made, a box highlighted the chosen
bar, and participants were given the opportunity to change their
response. A second key press was required to conﬁrm the high-
lighted choice in order to minimize impulsive responding. The
inter-trial-interval was 1-s.
Left and right positions of the risky and ambiguous bars were
counterbalanced across trials. The order of trials was randomized
across participants. Participants received no outcome feedback
during the task. Instead, they were told that one trial would be
selected at random at the end of the session, and they would be
paid according to the outcome of their selected bar on that trial.
Six of the risky versus ambiguous trials served as “catch” trials
because they featured a choice with an objectively correct answer.
On these trials the switch from red to blue in the risky bar occurred
within the portion of the bar that was not occluded in the ambigu-
ous bar (Figure 1D; 10% win-33% ambiguous, 10% win-50%
ambiguous, 90% win-33% ambiguous, 90% win-50% ambigu-
ous, 25% win-33% ambiguous, and 75% win-33% ambiguous).
The risky bar therefore clearly contained either a greater or smaller
amount of the winning color than the ambiguous bar. These catch
trials served as exclusion criteria for the Bar Choice task: a par-
ticipant was excluded from analyzes if s/he missed one or more
of these “catch” trials. Catch trials were excluded from reported
results and analyzes.
Data from seven children and one adult were excluded from the
Bar Choice task on the basis of these criteria, leaving a ﬁnal Bar
Choice sample of 35 children (17 female; mean age = 8.7 years)
and 39 adults (16 female; mean age = 22.4 years).
Willingness to Pay (WTP)
In the WTP task, participants were endowed with 12 tokens. They
were then shown each risky and ambiguous bar with the red and
blue ends labeled with their respective reward values. Participants
were asked to press arrow keys to toggle a number up or down
until the number reached their maximum WTP for the chance to
play that bar (Figure 1E). An additional key press conﬁrmed the
WTP value selection.
The order of trials was randomized across participants, and
each trial’s WTP start value was randomized to start at 2 or 12.
Participants were informed that one trial would be selected at
random at the end of the session and a price would be randomly
selected for that trial. If participants’ WTP was greater than or
equal to the randomly selected price, they would pay that price
from their endowment to“buy the bar”and then be paid according
to the outcome of their purchased bar. If their WTP was less than
the randomly selected price, they would pay nothing and receive
nothing (Becker et al., 1964).
Data from the seven children and 1 adult whose data were
excluded from Bar Choice task for failing to understand the bar
stimuli, as noted above in Bar Choice, were also excluded from
WTP. Data from an additional child was excluded from WTP
because her WTP for the risky bars did not increase with the prob-
ability of winning, indicating a failure to understand theWTP task.
All other participants’ WTP for the risky bars increased with the
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probability of winning, leaving a ﬁnal WTP sample of 34 children
(16 female; mean age = 8.7 years) and 39 adults (16 female; mean
age = 22.4 years).
Bar Probability
In the Bar Probability task, participants were shown each risky
and ambiguous bar and were asked to predict how many times
the bar would result in red and blue across 100 hypothetical trials.
Children verbally gave their responses to an experimenter, while
adults indicated their responses on a worksheet.
One child who struggled to produce responses on a scale of 100
trials was asked to give responses out of 10 hypothetical trials. Four
children who struggled to produce responses that summed to 100
trials were permitted to indicate their response for just one color
of their choosing rather than for both colors. These modiﬁcations
allowed children with limited mathematical skills to perform the
task while reducing frustrations.
Familiarity Bias
In order to measure familiarity bias, participants were given the
chance to win additional tokens by correctly guessing the ﬁnal
word on a random page in either a familiar book or an unfamiliar
book. Participants were asked to select one of two books for which
they would be asked to solve a multiple choice question with four
possible answers (Figure 4A). If they guessed the correct answer
(25% chance), they would win an additional ﬁve tokens. The order
of presentation of the books was counterbalanced across partic-
ipants. Children received verbal directions and indicated their
responses verbally or by pointing, while adults received written
directions and indicated their response on a worksheet.
Forty-one children completed the Familiarity Bias task (one
male 8.3-year-old did not complete this task due to lack of time).
For children, the familiar book was always the US edition of Harry
Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (HP-US) by J. K. Rowling. The unfa-
miliar book was either the corresponding UK edition of the same
book, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone (HP-UK), or Ham-
mer of Witches (HoW) by Shana Mlawski. For the 27 children who
recognized the physical HP-US book but did not recognize the
physical HP-UK book, the unfamiliar book was HP-UK. These
children were told that both books were the same story about
Harry Potter and his ﬁrst year at magic school, but one was sold
in the US while the other was sold in the UK. These children were
shown and read the opening of Chapter 4 in both books in order
to underscore that both books featured the same text but different
page numbers.
The remaining 14 children either recognized the Harry Potter
character but not the physical HP-US book or recognized both
the HP-US book and the HP-UK book. For these children, the
unfamiliar book was HoW. None of these children recognized
HoW. These children were told that HP-US was “a story about a
boy who can do magic and has adventures in his ﬁrst year of magic
school,” while HoW was “a story about a boy who can do magic
and has adventures in his ﬁrst time on a sailing ship.”
Adults did the Familiarity Bias task with HP-US and HP-UK.
Thirty-two of 40 adults indicated having read either HP-US or
HP-UK (12 female; mean age = 22.2 years). Their responses were
coded with the edition that they had previously read serving as
the familiar book. Familiarity bias data were not analyzed for the




On the risky versus ambiguous trials, we found evidence of (1)
ambiguity aversion in adults but not in children and (2) sig-
niﬁcantly greater ambiguity aversion in adults than in children.
Children chose the risky and ambiguous bars equally often on
non-catch trials (chose risk 51.1% of the time; compared to 50%
chance, t(34) = 0.41, 2-tailed p = 0.69). Adults chose the risky
gambles 59.5% of the time on non-catch trials, signiﬁcantly more
often than chance [t(38) = 5.29, 2-tailed p < 0.001] and signif-
icantly more often than the children did [t(72) = 2.69, 2-tailed
p = 0.01; Cohen’s d = 0.60; see Figure 2A]. These results still
held when excluding the 10 children who saw only seven levels of
risk [children compared to 50% chance, t(24) = 0.68, 2-tailed
p = 0.51; children compared to adults t(62) = 2.11, 2-tailed
p = 0.04; Cohen’s d = 0.53]. For illustrative purposes, we also
show the data from Figure 2A plotted by the risky bars’ probability
FIGURE 2 | Evidence of ambiguity aversion in adults but not in children
and significantly greater ambiguity aversion in adults than in children
across three separate measures. (A) Frequency of choosing the risky bar on
risky bar versus ambiguous bar trials in the Bar Choice task. (B) Frequency of
choosing the less ambiguous bar on ambiguous bar versus ambiguous bar
trials in the Bar Choice task. (C) Difference in willingness to pay (WTP) for
risky bars and ambiguous bars in theWTP task. Dotted lines indicate chance
performance. *indicates signiﬁcance at p < 0.05.
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of winning (Figure 3A) and the ambiguous bars’ proportion of
ambiguity (Figure 3B).
On the ambiguous versus ambiguous trials, we found qualita-
tively similar results. Children were equally likely to choose the
more and less ambiguous bars [chose less ambiguous 56.67% of
the time; compared to 50%chance, t(34)=1.11, 2-tailedp=0.28].
Adults, in contrast, chose the less ambiguous option 72.2% of the
time, signiﬁcantly more often than chance [t(38) = 4.42, 2-tailed
p < 0.001] and signiﬁcantly more often than the children did
[t(72) = 2.00, 2-tailed p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.46; see Figure 2B].
For both children and adults, the likelihood of choosing risky
on risky versus ambiguous trials signiﬁcantly correlated with the
likelihood of choosing the less ambiguous bar on ambiguous ver-
sus ambiguous trials [children: r(33) = 0.68, p < 0.001; adults:
FIGURE 3 | Ambiguity aversion in children and adults at different levels
of risk and amounts of ambiguity. Note that these are the same data as
Figure 2A, replotted here for illustrative purposes. (A) Frequency of
choosing the risky bar on risky bar versus ambiguous bar trials, plotted by
the risky bars’ probability of winning. (B) Frequency of choosing the risky
bar on risky bar versus ambiguous bar trials, plotted by the ambiguous bars’
proportion of ambiguity. Error bars indicate SE of the mean. Dotted lines
indicate linear regression ﬁts.
r(37) = 0.55, p < 0.001], indicating consistent attitudes towards
ambiguity across two different trial types within the task.
WILLINGNESS TO PAY (WTP)
On the WTP task, we again found evidence of (1) ambiguity aver-
sion in adults but not in children and (2) signiﬁcantly greater
ambiguity aversion in adults than in children. Children indicated
no difference in WTP for the risky bars (average WTP = 6.51
tokens) and the ambiguous bars [average WTP = 6.68 tokens;
paired t(33) = −0.69, 2-tailed p = 0.50], while adults were willing
to pay signiﬁcantly more for the risky bars (average WTP = 5.53
tokens) than for the ambiguous bars [average WTP = 4.78 tokens;
paired t(38) = 4.67, 2-tailed p < 0.001]. The difference in WTP
between the risky and ambiguous bars was signiﬁcantly greater
in adults than in children [t(71) = 3.15, 2-tailed p = 0.002; see
Figure 2C].
For both children and adults, the likelihood of choosing risky
on risky versus ambiguous bars in the Bar Choice task did not
correlate with the difference in their WTP between the risky and
ambiguous bars (all ps> 0.1). This result is consistent with previ-
ousﬁndings reporting shifts inpreferenceswhen comparing forced
choice and WTP tasks (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971).
BAR PROBABILITY
All participants included in the Bar Choice sample reported pre-
dicted outcomes for the risky bars that correctly scaled with the
bars’ actual probabilities. Children’s predicted outcomes linearly
ﬁt to the bars’ actual probability with an average slope of 1.06
(range 0.57–1.58), while adults’ predicted outcomes ﬁt with an
average slope of 1.04 (range 0.78–1.21). These results indicate that
children and adults understood the meaning of the risky bar stim-
uli and were fairly accurate in perceiving the bars’ proportions of
red and blue.
There were no signiﬁcant differences in children and adults’
reported predicted outcomes for the ambiguous bars: children
reported that an average of 50.6% of ambiguous bar outcomes
would result in their favorable color (yield a large reward), while
adults reported that an average of 51.1% of ambiguous bar out-
comes would result in their favorable color [t(72) = −0.31,
2-tailed p = 0.76]. Neither group’s predicted outcomes for the
ambiguous bars signiﬁcantly differed from a 50% chance of result-
ing in the favorable color [children: t(34) = 0.64, 2-tailed p = 0.53;
adults: t(38) = 0.88, 2-tailed p = 0.38]. Though both children
and adults explicitly reported a rational 50–50 estimation of the
ambiguous bars’ probabilities in the Bar Probability task, only
children also exhibited a rational interpretation of the ambigu-
ous bars on the Bar Choice and WTP tasks. The discrepancy
between adults’ explicitly reported values on the Bar Probabil-
ity task and their preferences as determined in the Bar Choice and
WTP tasks was consistent with past studies ﬁnding a disconnect
between true probabilities and individuals’ revealed probability
weights (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
FAMILIARITY BIAS
Children exhibited a signiﬁcant familiarity bias: 75.6% of the
children preferred to bet on the familiar book, a proportion signif-
icantly greater than chance (2-tailed p = 0.002; Figure 4B). This
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FIGURE 4 | A child-friendly guessing game found significant familiarity
bias in children. (A) Participants were asked to guess the ﬁnal word on a
random page of a book. Physical copies of a familiar and unfamiliar book were
shown, along with a page number and four possible ﬁnal words for that page.
Participants ﬁrst indicated if they wanted to guess for the familiar book or the
unfamiliar book, then indicated their guess from the four possible ﬁnal words.
Correct guesses (e.g., STUFF for the familiar book and COINS for the
unfamiliar book) were rewarded with ﬁve additional tokens. (B) Percentage of
participants that chose to guess for the familiar book. Dotted line indicates
chance performance. *indicates signiﬁcance at p < 0.05; +indicates p = 0.11.
result remained signiﬁcant when restricted to the 14 children who
used HoW as the unfamiliar book (85.7% chose familiar, 2-tailed
p = 0.01) and was marginally signiﬁcant when restricted to the 27
children who used HP-UK as the unfamiliar book (70.4%, 2-tailed
p = 0.05). This result also remained signiﬁcant when restricted to
the 34 children who both did the Familiarity Bias task and were
included in the ﬁnal Bar Choice sample (70.6%, 2-tailed p = 0.02).
Adults exhibited amarginally signiﬁcant familiarity bias: 65.6%
of the adults preferred to bet on the book that they reported having
previously read (2-tailed p = 0.11; Figure 4B). While this is a
weaker familiarity bias than what we observed in children, we
note that our adult participants, all of whom lived in the US at
the time of the experiment, may have recognized the physical HP-
US book even if they did not report having read it. When adult
analyzes were restricted to the 23 adults who reported having read
HP-US, those adults exhibited a signiﬁcant familiarity bias (78.3%,
2-tailed p = 0.01).
DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that children (8–9 years old) and young
adults (19–27 years old) hold signiﬁcantly different attitudes
towards ambiguity when making decisions about rewards. This
conclusion held across two tasks and three measures. To the best
of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to describe ambiguity
preferences in pre-adolescent children.
Our studydesign allowedus to reject the alternative explanation
that children and adults performed differently because children
did not comprehend the bar stimuli. All children included in the
ﬁnal samplepassed the same rigorous comprehension checks as the
adults: (1) correctly answering comprehension questions about
the risky and ambiguous bars in training, (2) correctly select-
ing the favorable bar on all catch trials in the Bar Choice task,
and (3) reporting predicted outcomes for the risky bars that cor-
rectly scaled with the bars’ probabilities. Additionally, children,
like adults, exhibited correlated ambiguity preferences during the
Bar Choice task across the two different trial types (risky versus
ambiguous; ambiguous versus ambiguous), demonstrating con-
sistent attitudes towards the ambiguous bars. We also note that
previous research has successfully used similar stimuli to rep-
resent probabilistic gambles with children as young as 4 and
5 years of age (Schlottmann and Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann,
2001).
We cannot, however, rule out that children were simply ignor-
ing the occluders on the ambiguous bars and making their
decisions based solely on the visibly equal amounts of red and blue
on the ambiguous bars. In fact, such an approach to the ambigu-
ous bars would represent a mathematically rational strategy that
follows expected utility theory: if the midpoint-centered occluders
could be covering all possible proportions of red and blue, then the
average expected proportion would be a 50–50 split. Thus, simply
ignoring the ambiguous occluders on the risky versus ambigu-
ous Bar Choice trials would be a strategic, economically rational
choice that does not necessarily indicate a lack of understanding of
the ambiguous bars. Future studies could use ambiguous stimuli
featuring visibly uneven amounts of red and blue (Peysakhovich
and Karmarkar, submitted) to investigate how children use known
information when assessing ambiguity.
Our study design also allowed us to probe the role of familiarity
bias in causing ambiguity aversion. As adult ambiguity aversion
has been theorized to result from a preference to bet on what
feels more familiar (Heath and Tversky, 1991; Fox and Tversky,
1995; Fox and Weber, 2002), a natural explanation for children’s
lack of ambiguity aversion could be that they are less sensitive
to familiarity. Our results argue against that alternative explana-
tion: we found that a signiﬁcant familiarity bias was present in
children, even though ambiguity aversion was absent. Additional
studies are needed to determine if other proposed mechanisms
of ambiguity aversion in adults (see Camerer and Weber, 1992
for review) are also present in children in order to determine
why ambiguity aversion is absent in children. For example, a lack
of ambiguity aversion can be interpreted as a sign of optimism
or lack of suspicion towards the motives of the experimenter
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(Kuhberger and Perner, 2003), and the emergence of ambigu-
ity aversion from childhood to adulthood may reﬂect an increase
in pessimism or suspicion towards others that comes with life
experiences. Future studies could manipulate experimenter trust-
worthiness (Kidd et al., 2012) in order to determine if and how
children’s expectations of the experimenter interact with their
attitudes towards ambiguity.
Our results are consistent with a previous study in which 12-
to 17-year-old adolescents exhibited less ambiguity aversion com-
pared to 30- to 50-year-old adults (Tymula et al., 2012). We cannot
make direct comparisons between the preferences of our child
sample and the adolescent sample of Tymula et al. (2012) because
we used different tasks to measure ambiguity aversion. We note,
however, that the adolescent sample of Tymula et al. (2012) exhib-
ited a signiﬁcant increase in ambiguity aversion as the level of
ambiguity increased, while our children were indifferent to ambi-
guity level on the Bar Choice trials. Thus, ambiguity aversion may
increase linearly with age across development, though additional
studies directly comparing children, adolescents, and adults are
needed to determine if this is the case. Finally, we note that our
ﬁndings are restricted to decisions involving potential gains. As
adolescents and adults have been found to be similarly ambiguity
neutral in the loss domain (Tymula et al., 2013), future stud-
ies should compare children’s ambiguity preferences for losses to
those of adults.
Our ﬁndings that children are surprisingly tolerant of ambi-
guity have important public health implications, as ambiguous
decisions are analogous to most real-world decisions, in which
outcome probabilities are not precisely known. In fact, ambigu-
ity tolerance, but not risk tolerance, in adolescents was found to
predict their engagement in real-world reckless behavior (Tymula
et al., 2012). Many interventions targeted towards reducing real-
world reckless behavior focus on adolescents because that age
group is especially vulnerable to preventable morbidity and mor-
tality that results from poor decision-making (Keeney and Palley,
2013). Our ﬁndings point to a developmental trajectory for ambi-
guity tolerance that emerges prior to adolescence, in childhood.
Consequently, policies aiming to reduce reckless behavior in ado-
lescents should consider addressing the behaviors and attitudes of
children, before they grow into adolescents.
CONCLUSION
Across three distinct measures in two different tasks, ambiguity
aversion was absent in 8- and 9-year-old children but present
in adults. When comparing risky gambles to ambiguous gam-
bles, children were equally likely to choose risk or ambiguity while
adults preferred risk over ambiguity. When comparing two gam-
bles of varying levels of ambiguity, children were equally likely to
choose the more or less ambiguous gamble while adults preferred
the less ambiguous gamble. When assigning value to risky and
ambiguous gambles, children priced them equally while adults
were willing to pay more for risky gambles. We also found that
children’s lack of ambiguity aversion was likely not driven by an
indifference to familiarity, for children did exhibit a bias to bet
on the familiar. Taken together, our results suggest that ambiguity
aversion emerges from childhood to adulthood and is not caused
by a bias toward familiarity.
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